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choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for
global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global
welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth,
thus allowing them to prevent the ‘poaching’ of their ‘brains’ by larger, wealthier markets.
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The notion that it is privately (but not globally) optimal for developing countries 
to ‘free ride’ on technological innovations produced by the developed world is well 
known in the intellectual property rights literature (see for example Chin and Grossman 
1990).  Over the years, this literature has also identified a number of factors that might 
induce developing countries to protect intellectual property.  These include the 
inappropriateness of Northern technology for the South (Diwan and Rodrik 1991), 
strategic reactions by Northern firms to the lack of Southern protection (Yang and 
Maskus 2001), dynamic effects on innovation in the South (Helpman 1993; Chen and 
Puttinanun 2005; Schneider 2005), the prospects of increased foreign direct investment or 
licensing (Markusen 2001, Maskus 2005), and of expanded international trade (Maskus 
and Penubarti 1995, Fink and Primo Baga 2005).  
 
An equally well known idea—in a different literature—is the notion that an 
outflow of skilled labor, or ‘brain drain’, hurts developing countries, due to diminished 
opportunities for within-country trade and fiscal externalities (e.g. Berry and Soligo 
1969; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974).  Countervailing factors that might create benefits 
from brain drain include increased incentives to acquire education in the sending country 
arising from an ‘emigration lottery’ (Mountford 1997) and added discipline on the 
sending country’s tax authorities (Bucovetsky 2003).  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the two literatures described above (on IPR policy in 
developing countries and the brain drain respectively) have remained largely isolated 
from each other.
1  This omission is particularly noteworthy in light of two key stylized 
facts.  First, immigrants—including those from developing countries—account for a large 
fraction of U.S. innovative activity.  For example, nearly one in five scientists and 
engineers in the United States is an immigrant (Zakaria 2005), while foreign students 
comprised 51 percent of U.S. science and engineering Ph.D. recipients in 2003 (Bound, 
Turner and Walsh (2009).  These counts probably understate immigrants’ contribution to 
U.S. innovation, since immigrant college graduates patent at twice the U.S. native rate 
(Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2009); immigrant graduate students also contribute 
disproportionately to U.S. innovation (Chellaraj, Maskus and Mattoo 2008).
2   Second, 
internationally mobile scientists can also represent a large share of sending countries’ 
innovative talent.  According to Docquier and Rapaport (2009), these flows are 
particularly high for countries that are both poor and relatively small, such as Guyana, 
                                                 
1 Mondal and Gupta (2008) introduce international labor mobility into Helpman’s (1993) model, but treat 
IPR policy as exogenous and consider only the limiting case of perfect international labor mobility.  Oettl 
and Agrawal (2008) empirically study the patent flows that result from international labor mobility.   To 
our knowledge, no existing papers model the choice of IPR policy in the presence of internationally mobile 
innovative talent.   
2 At the extreme top tail of the innovation distribution, Weinberg (2008) documents the flow of ‘star’ 
scientists out of developing nations, reporting a steep recent rise (to 14% for the 1990s) in  the share of 
Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics awarded to researchers born in developing countries.  
None of this prize-winning work was done in a developing country.     2
Haiti, and Kenya:  In 2000, 89, 84, and 47 percent of these countries’ university-educated 
natives were living in developed (OECD) countries.   
 
The goal of this paper is to study the interactions between IPR policy and brain 
drain.  We do so by considering an IPR policy game between countries in a context 
where workers who produce intellectual property are internationally mobile (at a cost), 
and where innovations display some country-specificity in their usefulness or appeal.  We 
offer two main contributions.  The first is to identify some hitherto unrecognized factors 
affecting any country’s (privately) optimal IPR policy, and the consequences of these 
factors for global efficiency. One such factor is what we term the “bidding for brains” 
effect.  Unless innovations are truly universal, governments have an incentive to 
manipulate local policy to attract footloose innovators. In sharp contrast to the well 
known “free riding” effect, “bidding for brains” induces countries to overprotect 
intellectual property, as an outcome of a global bidding war for innovative talent.   
 
 We also identify an “expatriate brains” effect. When part (or all) of a country’s 
intellectual workforce has departed to another country, the brain-sending country’s 
incentives to protect intellectual property may be weakened, because the marginal 
innovations produced by those innovators are less relevant to the Source country when 
produced abroad.  Thus, the ‘South’s’ incentives to set low IPRs may both be intensified 
and, in part explained by the fact that many of the South’s brains live in the North. 
 
A final contribution of our paper is to identify conditions in which each of the two 
above effects is likely to be important.  We show that the expatriate brains effect tends to 
dominate when developing countries are small or poor:  such countries have no hope of 
contesting the outflow of their brains via strong protection of intellectual property and 
instead, as predicted by the traditional IPR literature, are likely to choose zero protection 
in a Nash policy equilibrium.  The bidding-war effect is more likely to dominate as 
developing countries grow in prosperity and innovative capacity to a point where their IP 
laws are capable of having a quantitatively significant effect on the outflows of their 
brains.  In fact, as the South grows, we show that its Nash equilibrium IPR policy can rise 
from zero to levels similar to North’s, and that at this equilibrium, both countries 
overprotect intellectual property relative to globally efficient levels.  We therefore 
speculate that continued development in countries like China and India might one day 
replace the debate over intellectual ‘free-riding’ by those countries with one about 
excessive IPR protection in a global bidding war for the world’s top scientists, engineers 
and artists.
3   
                                                 
3 We recognize, of course, that IPRs are only one of many factors affecting the location choices of 
scientists, engineers and artists, and that IPR policy is affected by many factors (such as the hope for 
additional foreign investment) other than the desire to attract scientists to one’s country (or to prevent their 
departure).  Our goal, instead, is to point out interactions between IPR policy and the international 
migration of knowledge workers that have not, to our knowledge, been noted before, and that may have the 
potential to be quantitatively significant, especially as developing countries grow in market size and 
innovative capacity.     3
2. Related Literature  
 
As noted, our paper contributes to two literatures, one of which examines the 
determination and optimality of IPR policy in a group of nations.  In an early contribution 
to this literature, Chin and Grossman (1990) showed that low, or zero IPRs might be in 
the interests of developing countries, since the benefits of consuming Northern 
innovations at low cost override the gains to local innovators from stronger IPRs.  One 
cost to this ‘free-riding’ strategy, however, is the fact that relying solely on innovations 
produced by the North may generate innovations that are particularly inappropriate for 
the South (Diwan and Rodrik 1991).   
 
Another cost of low Southern IPRs is the possibility that zero protection stunts the 
development of innovative activity in the South, although Helpman (1993) has argued 
that zero Southern IPR may be optimal even in a fully dynamic model with endogenous 
Southern innovative capacity.  Since then, Lai (1998) has shown that Helpman’s result 
may depend on the way in which production is transferred to the South.  In particular, if 
production is transferred via foreign direct investment rather than imitation, the South can 
benefit from raising its IPRs.  In a similar vein, Glass and Wu (2007) show that whether 
strong IPRs raise Southern innovation depends also on whether innovation takes the form 
of improving existing products or developing new ones.  Finally, Lai and Qiu (2003) 
show that developing countries can gain from raising their IPR protection if this is 
accompanied by trade concessions on other fronts by the North.   
 
Two recent IPR papers that are closely related to ours are Grossman and Lai 
(2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2005), henceforth GL and BL.
4  A key question in these 
papers is the role of ‘scale effects’, which cause the optimal level of IPR protection under 
autarky to vary with the size of the economy.  In particular, if —as BL argue 
empirically— optimal IPR falls (under autarky) with market size, the North’s Nash 
equilibrium IPR protection can exceed the globally optimal level.  Because our main 
focus is on the interactions between IPR policy and international flows of brains, our 
paper abstracts from scale effects.
5  Aside from this, our main departure from BL and 
GL’s approach (other than to simplify various aspects to focus on essentials) is to 
introduce international mobility of the workers who produce ‘ideas’.  As already noted, 
this can also lead to overprotection of intellectual property in Nash equilibrium, this time 
by both the North and the South.   
 
The earliest economics papers on brain drain (e.g. Berry and Soligo 1969), and 
indeed on international factor mobility in general (e.g. Jones, Coelho and Easton 1986), 
focused on induced changes in domestic factor prices and producer surplus.
6   Although 
                                                 
4  More recent versions of BL (e.g. 2009), no longer contain Section 7, which considers the international 
IPR game.  These results are, however, briefly described in Grossman and Lai (2006).       
5 Specifically, in BL’s language and our notation, we assume that  =0  where  is essentially the 
elasticity of ‘idea supply’ with respect to market size.  Unlike the market size effect, the direction of the 
new effects identified in our paper do not hinge on the sign of .   
6 For recent reviews of the brain drain literature, see Commander et al. (2004), and Docquier and Rapaport 
(2009).    4
there are exceptions
7, in most of these models factor outflows reduce the welfare of 
remaining residents because they reduce their opportunities to trade with differently-
endowed agents.  Considerations that increase the damage from brain drain include fiscal 
externalities stemming from the interaction of publicly-subsidized education and 
progressive taxation (Bhagwati and Hamada 1974).  Also, in an endogenous growth 
framework, some authors have argued that an outflow of skilled workers will reduce a 
country’s growth rate (Miyagiwa 1991, Wong and Yip 1999).
8   
 
At the same time, however, the brain drain literature has identified a number of 
potential benefits from skilled emigration.  For example, Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975) 
have proposed that emigration provides a social “safety valve” for unemployed skilled 
workers in less developed countries.  Other potential benefits are remittances to the home 
country (e.g. Ozden and Schiff 2006), and the return migration of brains who have 
acquired new skills abroad.  More recently, the “emigration lottery” argument (Stark, 
Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998); Mountford 1997) has raised the possibility that 
foreign employment opportunities can raise the incentives to acquire education in less-
developed sending countries.  If enough of the newly-skilled workers stay, ‘opening the 
exits’ might ultimately raise a country’s stock of human capital and growth rate (Beine, 
Docquier and Rapaport 2008).
9  Finally, the networks created by skilled migrants may 
increase beneficial exchanges of goods, factors and ideas between the home and host 
countries (Lopez and Schiff 1998; Kanbur and Rapaport 2005; Oettl and Agrawal 2008).  
 
  The closest paper to the current one in the “brain drain” literature is our own 
(Kuhn and McAusland 2009).  Unlike most of the brain drain literature, that paper 
explicitly models ‘brains’ as mobile producers of patentable/copyrightable ideas, whose 
relevance to consumers depends on the country in which those ideas were invented.  That 
paper’s main goal is to establish conditions under which brain drain might benefit a small 
Source country. IPR policy is taken as exogenous, and Nash policy interactions between 
countries are not modeled.
10  Thus, the current paper can be viewed either as 
endogenizing IPRs in our own previous model of brain drain, or as introducing 
international mobility of brains into BL or GL’s model of IPR determination.   
 
 
                                                 
7 For example, the two-good, two-factor small open economy model in which factor rewards are 
independent of factor endowments, and the case of large countries whose terms of trade are advantageously 
affected by a factor outflow. 
8 Introducing a skilled worker outflow into more traditional growth models (where growth occurs purely 
via either human or physical capital accumulation) has less dramatic negative long run effects (see, e.g. 
Rodriguez 1975).  
9 Even more recently, Bucovetsky (2003) and Haupt and Janeba (2004) have argued that the possibility of 
skilled emigration may impose useful discipline on the tax authorities in skilled-worker “sending” 
countries.  
10 Other differences of the current paper from Kuhn-McAusland  (2009) include a heterogeneous 
population of potential migrants (KM consider only the effects or relocating a single ‘designer’), the fact 
that we include Source’s designers (both resident and expatriate) in Source’s welfare function, and a greater 
emphasis here on cases where translation costs are high (i.e. τ is low). Low τ seems more appropriate for 
developing countries (which are our main interest here).       5
3. Model 
 
We consider a world with two countries, Source and Recipient; values for 
Recipient are denoted with asterisks.  Let N, N* denote the number of consumers in each 
country. Each country is endowed with a stock of designers D and D*; designers create 
unique goods of endogenous quality but do not consume goods themselves.
11 
 
Consumers are willing to pay more for goods the higher their quality, ρ, and 
relevance, r. Specifically, we assume per capita inverse demand for a good is given by 







) (    denote the elasticity of base demand; we assume ε is decreasing in q, 
thus ensuring each designer’s profit maximization problem has an interior solution. 
 
We can interpret ρ as measuring intrinsic quality of a good; for example, ρ may 
index the quality of graphics in a computer game, the speed with which a cold medicine 
suppresses symptoms, or the number of laugh-out-loud moments in a movie.  Relevance 
measures the value of these attributes to consumers.  While there may be some 
innovations with close to universal relevance—e.g. instrumental music and some basic 
scientific discoveries—, for many goods consumers will exhibit home bias: powerful 
software for preparing US tax returns will have limited value to non-US consumers, 
while jokes catering to moviegoers in one country may be less potent for audiences 
abroad.
12  We assume home bias takes the form of an iceberg “translation” cost 1-τ, 
where τ measures the fraction of a good’s value that survives translation to a foreign 
market.  Thus r = 1 if a good is consumed in the same country as it is developed and 
equals τ otherwise. For the majority of this paper we treat τ as a parameter outside the 
control of designers and governments.  
 
We assume each designer develops a prototype for a distinct good, replicas of 
which can be produced at zero cost.  Define π
 = maxq p(q)q as the maximum per capita 
base profits available in the Source market when a designer has monopoly power in 
Source; define π* similarly. As reproduction is costless, each designer will choose per 
capita deliveries such that ε=1 in each market. Given the separability of relevance, 
quality and quantity in consumers’ demand functions, we can treat π
 as a parameter when 
examining designers’ investment and location problems.   
 
We follow Grossman and Lai (2004) in assuming that government enforces a 
designer’s monopoly power in a probabilistic fashion. Specifically, let ω and ω* measure 
the probability that an individual designer will have full monopoly power over sales of 
her good in the Source and Recipient countries respectively. If her monopoly rights are 
not enforced in a country, a designer faces competition from local competitive pirates; as 
                                                 
11 If instead designers also consumed goods, then their migration would shift the composition of global 
demand. This demand shift would make the receiving market even more profitable, attracting additional 
migrants from the sending country. 
12 At the extreme end of the home bias spectrum, one can even imagine innovations (such as developing 
certain kinds of weapons) that are of negative value to consumers in one country when invented in another.       6
marginal reproduction costs are zero, the designer earns zero revenues from sales of her 
good in, for example, Source with probability 1-ω. We interpret ω as an index of the 
strictness of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in the Source country. 
 
We assume goods are traded freely between countries and rule out the possibility 
of gray or parallel imports
13.  Using the definitions, we can rewrite the designer’s total 
expected revenues from her global market when residing in Source as 
Nωρπ+τN*ω*ρπ*.
14 To simplify matters, we assume π=π*, i.e. any differences between 
Source and Recipient in the number or incomes of consumers are captured by differences 
in N and N*.  Define M≡ [Nω +τN*ω*]π. Using similar logic and definitions, when a 
designer resides in Recipient, her expected revenues from supplying quality ρ* is given 
by M*ρ* where M*≡[τNω+N*ω*]π. We can interpret M and M* as the effective 
expected market sizes facing a designer according to where she resides.  We will be 
frugal and regularly omit the qualifier that revenues (and hence profits and welfare) are 
all expected values, although this will be implicit in the analysis.  
 
It is worth noting that, for the analysis from here forward, we could just as easily 
think of N, N* as measuring market wealth, where N=nb(I), N*=n*b(I*), in which n and 
n* are population counts while b(·) is an increasing function of (exogenous) per capita 
income I, I*.
15  Accordingly, we will often refer to differences between N and N* as 




Improving product quality is costly. It may require spending additional hours in 
the laboratory, acquiring additional human capital, or hiring complementary inputs.  We 
will refer to all such actions as investments. Let c(ρ) measure the total cost of producing a 
prototype of quality ρ.  To make things simple we assume 
 









16 ]. 1 , 0 (    
 
The designer chooses her quality/investment level before she knows whether her 
intellectual property rights will be enforced in any given market; her optimal investment 
                                                 
13 That is, we assume consumers and third parties are prohibited from purchasing goods in one market for 
consumption or resale in another market. 
14 Consistent with the principle of National Treatment, we implicitly assume goods face the same 
probability of property rights infringement, regardless of whether they are designed locally or abroad.  
Moreover, only a product’s designer may take out a patent on that product, regardless of where the product 
was designed/produced. 
15 For example, if per capita inverse demand is b(I)ρtp(q) , then M=b(I)nω+τb(I*)n*ω*. 
16 See Section 6 for a discussion of available evidence concerning Ψ.   In addition to these empirical 
considerations, our focus on the Ψ≤1 case is also motivated by our interest in the showing the potential for 
one country’s IPRs to harm others, in contrast to most existing research.  (Kuhn and McAusland 2009 show 
that (for fixed IPRs)  Ψ>1 is a necessary condition for brain drain to benefit the Source country.)   7
therefore depends on the size of her expected global market. When the designer lives in 
Source she chooses ρ to  
 
maxρ  ρM - c(ρ). 
 
The cost function’s convexity ensures the second order conditions for an interior 
maximum hold; rearranging the first order condition M= c’(ρ) yields 
 
ρ(M)=M
Ψ.        (1)  
 
Similarly, when a designer resides in Recipient, she will provide quality ρ*=M*
Ψ. Not 
surprisingly, quality is increasing in effective market size.  Define P(M) and P(M*), 
respectively, as expected profits earned by a designer residing in Source or Recipient; 





















Migrating is costly. Index each Source-born designer by her relocation cost z—the 
monetary-equivalent of physical and psychological costs of leaving one’s native land and 
setting up shop abroad.  We assume z~[0, z]   and define f(z) and F(z) as the probability 
and cumulative density functions for z with F(z) = 1 .  Similarly, let  * z   measure the cost 
to Recipient-born designer of type z* of relocating to Source, where z*~[-z, 0 ]  with 




Define g(M,M*)≡P(M*)-P(M) as the gap between profits available in Recipient 
and Source; we will regularly suppress the arguments of g. Assuming indifferent 
designers stay home, we can define z ~ as the lowest type designer who chooses to reside 
in Source: 
 








0 , min ~
g if z g
g if z g
z       ( 2 )  
 
Designers with type greater than or equal to z ~  will choose to reside in Source.   
 
Provided the gap between profits is not too large, Source and Recipient IPRs 
impact migration as follows:
18  
                                                 
17 We also examined a version of the model in which designers differ in their investment costs but face a 
common relocation cost. Not surprisingly, this alternate model predicts the most talented designers are the 
first to migrate while the least talented stay home. Although the mathematics are more complicated, in that 
model governments face the same qualitative incentives as identified in section 4. 
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4. Policy Game 
 
  We assume the governments of Source and Recipient each set domestic policy so 
as to maximize the expected welfare, E(W) and E(W*), of local consumers from the 
consumption of goods produced worldwide, plus profits (net of moving costs) of native 
born designers. Although some readers may wonder whether governments weight the 
welfare of emigrants the same as natives who stay home, we believe this is a sensible 
approach as policy is set prior to emigration decisions in our model.
19  Following the 
same principle, we assume host country governments put no weight on the welfare of 
potential immigrants when setting IPRs. 
 
We assume each government sets domestic IPRs taking the policy of its neighbor 
as fixed. In the interest of brevity, we only write out only the portion of the first order 
conditions and the like corresponding to z ~ ≥ 0.
20 Source, for example, solves maxω E(W) 
where  
 
E(W) =          * ) ~ ( * ) ~ ( 1 1 D z DF z F D N            
     
z
zdz z f D M DP z F M P z F D
~
0 ) ( *) ( ) ~ ( ) ( ) ~ ( 1    (3) 
 
and z ~ is as defined by (2), subject to the constraint ω ] 1 , 0 [   and taking ω* as given.  
 
In  equation (3), φ and μ are base consumer surplus per capita for goods sold by a 
monopolist and competitive firms, respectively; we assume base consumer surplus is 
identical across countries: φ*=φ and μ*=μ.   Under reasonable assumptions concerning 
the implicit demand function p(q), μ is greater than π+φ. In what follows, μ-(φ+π)>0 will 
represent the per capita (base) deadweight loss from monopoly power.  
 
Assuming an interior solution, Source’s “non-cooperative” best response ω
 (ω*) 
solves the following first order condition: 
 
                                                 
19 Excluding emigrants from Source’s welfare function (and including them in Recipient’s) would also 
significantly complicate the model, because it could lead to possible dynamic inconsistencies in both 
countries’ IPR policies.  For example, designers will anticipate that, after migration takes place, the talent-
sending country will disown its emigrant talent (and the profits they earn) and weaken local IPRs 
accordingly. 
20 An unabbreviated statement of Source’s best response would of course allow for in-migration from 
Recipient in cases where ω* is sufficiently small.  The numerical simulations presented in Section 6 and 7 
allow for migration in either direction.    9
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       (4) 
            
when set equal to zero.   
 
Source’s government balances a variety of competing concerns when setting 
domestic IPRs.  Some of these concerns are well known from the literature on IPRs. For 
example, strict IPRs give designers monopoly power, reducing allocative efficiency.  
Conversely, strict IPRs allow designers to reap the benefits from investments in 
innovation; in our model induced innovation ultimately raises the quality of goods 
produced.  
 
Finally, and unique to our analysis, strengthening Source IPRs stems the outflow 
of designing talent: the brain retention effect of strong IPRs. As identified in Kuhn and 
McAusland (2009), when τ<1, brain drain leads to relevance diversion: goods that would 
have been 100% relevant to Source consumers (had their respective designers remained 
Source residents) only have relevance τ <1 if the designer emigrates. Raising ω makes 
Source a more attractive base of operations, encouraging the marginal emigrant to stay 
home, thereby preventing relevance loss of 1-τ on that designer’s products.
21 
 
Recipient balances similar concerns when setting local IPRs.  Recipient’s 
government chooses ω* to maximize 
 
E(W*) =      *) ( * *] ) ~ ( [ * )] ~ ( 1 [ * 1 * * M P D D z DF z F D N               ,  
      
subject to the constraint ω* .  Assuming an interior solution, Recipient’s best 
response, ω*(ω) solves 
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D z DF N N
M
z F D N       (5) 
when set equal to zero.   
 
Above we assume interior solutions. However a corner solution to one country’s 
IPR choice is quite possible. If, for example, Recipient is sufficiently large, then so long 
                                                 
21 Designer relocation to a larger market also raises the quality of goods produced, so quality-adjusted 
relevance declines only by ρ-ρ*τ, which Kuhn and McAusland (2009) show to be positive whenever Ψ≤1.    10
as Recipient offers some IP protection, Source might  prefer to free ride (setting ω=0) 





NC as the IPRs that jointly solve the system formed by 
equations (4) and (5) under the following complementary slackness conditions: [1-
ω]dE(W)/dω ≤ 0 ≤ ω, ωdE(W)/dω ≥ 0 ≤ 1-ω, [1-ω*]dE(W*)/dω* ≤ 0 ≤ ω*, 
ω*dE(W*)/dω* ≥ 0 ≤ 1-ω*.  ωe
NC and ωe*
NC are the equilibrium strategies played in a 
non-cooperative policy game between Source and Recipient. 
 
 
5. Bidding for Brains 
 
As Grossman and Lai (2004) identify, when choosing policy stringency, each 
country ignores the benefits that domestic IP protections confer on foreigners:  strict 
domestic IPRs raise the expected profits of foreign born producers, and spur innovation 
which benefits overseas consumers. Each country’s failure to internalize these external 
benefits of strict domestic IPRs suggests that, from a global welfare perspective, IPRs in 
the Nash equilibrium may be too weak.  The benefit-internalization failure is most 
apparent in our model when translation costs are small. In what follows, define 
E(W
G)≡E(W)+E(W*) as expected Utilitarian Global welfare; define ω
G(ω*) as the global 
welfare maximizing Source IPRs when Recipient IPRs are ω*, with a similar definition 
for ω*
G(ω).  Define ωe
G  and ωe*
G as the IPRs that jointly maximize E(W
G) subject to the 
constraints ω
G , ω*
G .  ] 1 , 0 [  ] 1 , 0 [ 
 
Proposition 1: When translation costs are sufficiently small (i.e. τ sufficiently large) 
(a) each country’s non-cooperative best response is to set weaker IPRs than would a 













Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
When τ is large, designers have little incentive to emigrate. Even if some do 
relocate from Source to Recipient, the resulting relevance diversion is small because little 
is lost in translation.  Accordingly, when the fraction of a good’s value that survives 
                                                 
22 For example, when z is finite, then whenever ω*>0 and N* is sufficiently large then g>z  and F(z ~ )=1 
for all values of ω, rendering 
 d
z dF ) ~ (
=0. Rewriting (4) gives 
     

 
          
*




D D D D N
d
W dE 
         

. As 
  * D D             is negative, then 
*





        sufficiently small—or, 
alternately stated, ω*>0 and N* sufficiently large—is a sufficient condition for dE(W)/dω<0 for all 
ω[0,1]. 
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translation to a foreign market, τ, is high, each country’s Brain Gain/Retention motive is 
small, freeing governments to set IPRs so as to balance traditional concerns over 
allocative inefficiency and induced innovation, ignoring benefits to overseas consumers 
and foreign-born producers.  Consequently, when translation costs are low, countries err 
on the side of under-protecting intellectual property relative to what would maximize 
global welfare.  
 
If translation costs are instead non-negligible, the power of weak IPRs to repel 
footloose talent is more pronounced: when innovations are, to some extent, region 
specific, designers will find it important to produce them in the market most likely to let 
them collect the fruits of their labor. Recognizing this, each government has an incentive 
to tighten domestic IPRs in a bid to attract footloose talent—the bidding for brains effect. 
Because each government ignores one of the costs—the relevance diversion suffered by 
consumers abroad—of this bidding, it follows that non-cooperative IPRs may be too 
strong when viewed from a global welfare perspective.  
 
The strength of the bidding for brains effect relative to traditional concerns 
regarding free riding depends largely on τ. As per Proposition 1, if τ is large then the 
amount of relevance lost when a designer emigrates is small and free-riding concerns 
dominate. However, if translation costs are instead large, then free-riding is relatively 
unimportant since products developed for one market offer little value to consumers 
abroad; likewise, IPRs abroad offer little inducement to inventors at home.  Relevance 
diversion, on the other hand, will be significant, heightening incentives to poach foreign 
talent via overly strict IPRs. This bidding effect induces the talent-sending country to 
over-protect intellectual property, as per the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: When translation costs are sufficiently high (i.e. τ sufficiently small), 
Source’s non-cooperative best response to Recipient’s IPRs is too strict when viewed 
from a global welfare perspective; i.e. ω
NC(ω*) ≥  ω





Proof: See Appendix 1.  
 
If Recipient and Source are sufficiently similar in size, they end up in a bidding war 
characterized by sub-optimally strict IPRs. 
 
Proposition 3: When translation costs are sufficiently high (i.e. when τ is sufficiently 
low) and the countries are symmetric then both Source and Recipient set non-cooperative 




Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
If countries are instead asymmetric, there is a final distortion that must be 
considered. As noted above, as translation costs rise, the link between ω* and profits and 
consumer surplus abroad weakens, suggesting that traditional concerns over free riding 
become less important. However when talent is mobile, there will be one group of   12
Source-borns who benefit from strong Recipient IPRs even when τ is small: immigrant 
talent. As Proposition 4 lays out, if Source’s market is sufficiently small, the brain drain 
costs of beggar-thy-neighbor IPRs will also be small and the revenue-internalization 
failure will dominate, rendering Recipient’s non-cooperative IPRs too weak from a global 
welfare perspective.  
 
Proposition 4: When Source is sufficiently small, Recipient’s policy is too weak from a 
global welfare perspective.  
 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
Combined, Propositions 2 and 4 suggest that, when countries are unequal in size 
and translation costs are sufficiently high, it could well be the case that non-cooperative 
IPRs are too strict in the small country and too weak in the large country when viewed 
from a global welfare perspective.  In this sense—Source’s IPRs are certainly too strict 
when τ  is low enough while Recipient’s IPRs may be too high or low depending on 
relative market size—we can say that, perhaps surprisingly, Source’s incentives to raise 




  To explore additional properties of our model when countries differ in size and 
innovative capacity, we consider a case where consumers’ inverse demand function, p(q), 
is linear, and we normalize consumer surplus when a good is competitively supplied (i.e. 
when the price is zero), to μ=1.  It immediately follows that profits when the good is 
monopolistically supplied, π, equal .5 and that consumer surplus under monopoly, φ, is 
.25.    
We then think of our two countries as the United States and China and solve for 
Nash equilibria under what seem to be reasonable parameter values.  Since N (and N*) 
represent the size of the market for consumer goods in our model, we use GDP to 
approximate these magnitudes.  Normalizing N* =1, and using IMF GDP statistics for 
2008 yields an N for China of ($4.4/14.3 billion), or about .3.   D*/N* represents the 
share of the U.S. population who are “designers”; we estimate this by the share of U.S. 
research and development expenditures to GDP; according to Boldrin and Levine (2009, 
p. 868) this was about 3 percent in 2002, thus D*=.03.  To estimate the share of the 
South’s population engaged in R&D, we note that, between 1975 and 1999, only 8 
percent of U.S. patents were attributed to inventors not living in the U.S., European 
Union or Japan (Griffith, Lee and Van Reenen 2007, Table 2).  Optimistically assigning 
one quarter of those patents to China yields a D of (.08/4).03 = .0006.
23   
 
                                                 
23 While it is clear that China accounts for fewer than one quarter of US patents by inventors outside the 
US, EU and Japan, it is also clear that not all innovations result in US patents, in part because (as suggested 
by our model) not all innovations are relevant to US consumers.  Further it seems likely that the share of 
innovations that do not result in US patents is higher in less-developed countries, including China.  Overall, 
we view our estimate of Chinese innovation at .08/4 = two percent of US innovation as a reasonable 
estimate of relative magnitudes.     13
Boldrin and Levine make numerous attempts to estimate the elasticity of 
inventive activity with respect to the reward to innovation, Ψ.  For the largest market size 
considered, (which is most applicable to our model, since our marginal inventor is 
indifferent between moving to the U.S. and not), Figure 2 in their paper estimates Ψ to be 
about .2.
24   As a point of reference for our results in the presence of brain drain, it is 
worth noting that in our model Ψ =.2 leads to a privately optimal IPR level, ω, of .5 
under autarky for any country, regardless of size and regardless of the ratio of designers 
to consumers (D/N).
25   
 
Empirical evidence on the magnitude of τ, the relevance of Northern innovations 
to Southern consumers (and vice versa) is scarce.  For a number of reasons, including 
ecological specificities (see for example Kremer and Zwane 2005)
26 and lack of LDC 
research infrastructure and tacit knowledge required to understand and implement 
Northern innovations (Evenson and Binswanger 1978), we would expect the 
transferability of Northern innovations to the South to be much less than the value of 2/3 
estimated by Eaton and Kortum (1999) among the five most developed nations.  
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) report a case study where the same innovation was only 
one quarter as productive in an Indian as a U.S. plant.  Using data on manufacturing 
industries, they estimate that output per worker would rise by a factor of 1.5 for LDCs as 
a whole, and by a factor of 3.2 for the poorest LDCs, if new technologies were designed 
for Southern rather than Northern skill mixes alone (leaving aside all other sources of 
inappropriateness).
27  Taking all of the above considerations into account, we use τ =.25 
as our baseline parameter.
28     
 
Finally, we model the density of moving costs, f(z), as uniform on the interval [0, 
1/a].  We choose a=5 so that, in the equilibrium of the base case of our model, a 
substantial fraction of Source’s brains (just under half) live in the North.  Since we do not 
endogenize skill formation in our model, it seems reasonable to think of designers here as 
persons who are currently capable of producing patentable inventions; by this measure 
the share of South’s brains living in the North will be much higher than the emigration 
rates of highly-educated workers reported for most countries in Docquier and Rapaport 
(2009).   
 
  Source and Recipient’s reaction functions under the above assumptions are shown 
by the thick lines in Figure 1.   
 
                                                 
24 Elsewhere in their paper they estimate both larger and smaller values of Ψ in a variety of contexts.  In 
their model, the only variation in innovative activity is on the extensive margin (number of inventors), 
whereas (at least absent immigration) we model the intensive margin only.  Nevertheless, Ψ measures the 
response of interest in both cases.   
25 Globally optimal IPRs are also .5 for all countries when countries are symmetric.   
26  Sachs (2003) importantly points out that ecological specificities extend beyond agriculture, into areas 
including health, construction and building materials, energy sources and uses, and infrastructure design.  
27 Statistics are taken from row 2 of Acemoglu and Ziliibotti (2001) Table IV; specifically, 41/27 = 1.5 and 
16/5 = 3.2 
28 Appendix 2 and footnote 28 consider some cases with alternative values.    14



























The set of all possible Source and Recipient IPRs forming the space in Figure 1 is
divided into three regions:  To the northwest of the “zero migration” line, brain migration
is into Source from Recipient.  This occurs despite Source’s smaller market size because 
Source protects intellectual property much more than Recipient.  To the southeast of








.  At the 
 
ed in the current 
ample by the fact, already noted, that Recipient ignores benefits of IPRs that accrue to 
rs 
om Source into Recipient.   
 
Source’s reaction function jumps downward at the “zero migration” boundary, 
because the countries’ different population sizes create a discrete jump in the marginal 
number of brains that are attracted (or retained) by raising ω.  Beyond that, because of
small size, in this example Source finds it optimal not to protect intellectual property, but 
to free ride on Recipient’s inventions (even with τ = .25 the U.S.’s much larger R&D 
sector makes ‘free riding’ very appealing).  Recipient’s privately optimal IPRs (at around
.5) are relatively independent of Source’s IPRs, due to Source’s small market size
Nash equilibrium (ω=0,  ω*=.51) Recipient underprotects intellectual property relative 
to the global optimum (ω=0,  ω*=.55).  (The RecipOpt curve shows the level of 
Recipient’s IPR,  ω*, that maximizes global welfare for every fixed ω and vice versa for
SourceOpt).  Even though Recipient has an incentive to overprotect IP to ‘beggar 
Source’s brains” (the bidding-for-brains effect), this effect is outweigh
ex
Source’s brains living in Recipient (i.e. the expatriate brains effect).  
  
  Figures 2 through 4 show what happens in our model as China’s market size and 
innovative capacity (D and N) grow relative to to the U.S., holding the other paramete
of our model constant.  In Figure 2, China has eliminated half the China-U.S. gap in both   15
market size and innovative capacity, so N=.65 and D=.015.  Now, Nash equilibrium 
protection is positive in both countries, but protection remains below the global optim
In Figure 3, about two thirds of the market-size gap is gone, and Source protection rises 
dramatically (to about .5) in equilibrium. Both countries now overprotect intellectu
property relative to the global optimum.  Finally, Figure 4 shows the limiting, symmetric 
case where the two countries are identical. As we have demonstrated analytically, 
equilibrium migration is zero in this case, with b
um.  
al 
oth countries now selecting much higher 
vels of IPR than the global optimum (.79 versus .50), in an attempt to outbid each other 
r the world’s footloose innovative talent.
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29 An important caveat to the over-protection result is that it will not necessarily hold if τ, the relevance of 
Northern innovations to the South, rises sufficiently rapidly as the South expands in market size and 
innovative talent.  For example, if τ is a decreasing function of the gap between Northern and Southern per 
capita incomes, then income growth in the South could reduce the extent to which migration generates a 
relevance loss in the first place.  In this case, a “race” between increasing cultural/technological proximity 
and increasing market size will determine whether Southern IPR protection rises or falls as South grows.  
However, we point out that, at least for countries with vastly different population sizes like China and the 
United States, total market size, N, is likely to catch up to N* long before per capita incomes equalize.   16


































































7.1 Can Brain Drain Explain LDCs’ Non-Protection of IPRs?  
 
 Thus far, we have shown that introducing international mobility of 
scientists/designers might lead a developing country to overprotect IPRs—the “bidding 
for brains” effect.  We have also shown that the bidding-for-brains effect is more likely to 
dominate the well known “free riding” effects when South’s market size grows to a point 
where South can effectively contest the outflow of its brains by strengthening local IPRs.  
In this section we change our focus to the case where South is small, and show –perhaps 
surprisingly—that international mobility of scientists can, under certain conditions, also 
help explain why small, poor countries do not protect intellectual property.  This 
countervailing tendency arises from what we call the expatriate brains effect.   
 
 To explore the possibility that out-migration causes weak IPRs, we begin by 
rearranging the expression for dE(W)/dω in (4) to isolate terms containing F(z ~ ): 
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. (9) 
 
The final term in (9) measures a two-pronged expatriate brains effect of 
migration. The first prong is as follows. Marginally increasing ω raises expected base 
profits by Nπ for locals but only by τNπ for expatriates, with implications for induced 
innovation: strict local IPRs buy less quality at the margin when talent operates abroad. 
This effect of expatriate brains argues in favor of weaker Source IPRs.  The other prong 
concerns allocative inefficiency.  When designers emigrate, the quality-adjusted 
relevance of their goods to the Source market declines. In turn, the deadweight loss from 
allowing monopoly power in the Source market shrinks, arguing in favor of stricter 
Source IPRs.  Thus, whether the net expatriate brains effect leads to stricter or weaker 
policy depends on parameter values. For example, when Ψ=1, we find the final term in 
(9) is negative for all ω<1 (and equal to zero when ω=1) whenever τ<1 provided 2φ+π > 
μ.
30  
In sum, in contrast to the ‘bidding-for-brains’ effect, which always raises a 
country’s demand for IPRs, the ‘expatriate brains’ effect may  shift the sending brain-
sending country’s IPR best response function inwards.  This happens because Source’s 
incentives to protect IPRs are weakened when a large share of its native designers reside 
 
30 We have no qualms about this restriction, since 2φ+π>μ is also a necessary condition for each country to 
offer less than full IPRs in autarky when Ψ=1.   18
abroad, producing innovations that are less relevant to Source’s consumers.  A key  
distinction between the two effects is that the bidding-for-brains effect operates whenever 
a marginal, unilateral change in IPR policy would lead any brains to switch their location.  
This includes the symmetric-country Nash equilibrium in which net migration is zero.  
The expatriate brains effect, in contrast, does not require immigration flows to respond to 
IPRs; it does however require a significant share of Source’s brains to be living abroad 
(for whatever reason).  Thus, we expect to see the two effects in different situations.  This 
is illustrated in Appendix 2, which reports simulations of our model in which shutting 
down the possibility of international migration raises South’s Nash equilibrium IPRs 
from zero to a positive level, due to an expatriate brains effect.
31  As expected, this 
occurs in a situation where Source’s market size is small, when τ is low, but when Sou
is relatively well endowed with innovative talent (this is needed to give Source an 




7.2 Endogenous Relevance 
 
Our baseline model assumes that the relevance of Source-produced goods to 
Recipient consumers is fixed at τ. This ignores the growing phenomenon of designers 
developing products specifically for overseas markets.
32 We analyze this possibility by 
introducing an intermediate stage into the game. Suppose that, after having chosen her 
quality level, ρ, a Source-based designer can make an investment that increases the 
relevance of her product to the overseas market. Critically, we assume it is cheaper for a 
designer to provide goods of a given relevance to a market if she lives in that market.  
Specifically, we assume a Source-residing designer achieves relevance r[τ,1] in the 
Recipient market at cost d(r)≥0, where d (τ)=0.  We assume increased relevance to the 
Recipient market simultaneously reduces relevance in Source, so that a Source-residing 
designer’s effective market size is M(r)=πNω[1+τ-r]+πrN*ω*.
33  The designer’s 
associated optimization problem—taking ω, ω*, residency, and ρ as given—is 
  
   ) ( ) ( * * ] 1 [ max r d c rN r N
r            
with accompanying first order condition for an interior solution  
 
   ) ( ' * * r d N N      .         ( 1 0 )  
 
Assuming d′(τ)=0, limr→1 d′(r)=∞ and d″>0, it is straightforward to show that all 
designers residing in Source choose the same relevance level, which is less than unity but 
greater than τ provided N*ω*>Nω.  Assuming the second order conditions for an interior 
                                                 
31 If an initial increase in development leads a large number of a country’s ‘brains’ to leave –perhaps 
because educational quality has improved--, this mechanism might help explain Chen and Puttinanun’s 
(2005) finding of a U-shaped relationship between development and IPRs.   
32 Our thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension. 
33 For completeness, note we assume designers residing in Recipient also have the option to shift the 
relevance of their goods in favor of their overseas market.  However, because relevance to the Recipient 
market would simultaneously decline, Recipient-based designers will forego this opportunity—choosing 
relevance levels 1 and τ in the Recipient and Source markets—whenever N*ω*>Nω. 
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maximum hold, designers continue to choose ρ to satisfy (1) in the preceding stage, and 
Source-born designers for whom relocation costs are relatively small will emigrate.  
 
We are interested in how the endogenous choice of r affects the incentives facing 
governments when choosing local IPRs. As before, each government recognizes that 
strengthening its IPRs reduces allocative efficiency, raises investment incentives, and 
stems some relevance diversion by inducing the marginal migrant to stay home. When 
relevance is endogenous, a fourth concern emerges.  Strengthening Source IPRs has the 
direct effect of raising expected profits available in the Source market. Designers rooted 
in Source will take advantage of this increased profitability by increasing the relevance of 
their products to the Source market.   
 
If quality is relatively unresponsive to IPRs—i.e. if the induced innovation effect 
of IPRs on ρ is weak—then it is straightforward to show that strict IPRs provide each 
country with a means for retaining/stealing virtual brains via induced changes in r, 
further incenting each country to set overly-strict IPRs. 
 
If, instead, quality is responsive to IPRs, the story is a little less clear.  An IPR-
induced increase in ρ amplifies the gap between profits available in small and large 
markets, making high r even more attractive to Source-based designers. As this indirect 
effect favors the large Recipient country, it is straightforward to show dr/dω* is 
unambiguously positive. Accordingly, endogenous relevance choice provides Recipient 
with an added incentive to set strict local IPRs even when quality is responsive to IPRs. 
 
For Source, the net effect is ambiguous: raising ω makes it more likely that 
designers will receive monopoly rewards in exchange for catering to the Source market, 
but the induced increase in ρ makes serving the Recipient market more attractive as well. 
Although it is straightforward to find cases where the former effect clearly dominates—
consider the case where quality is exogenously determined—, we are unable to rule out 
the possibility that, for some functional forms and parameter values, the latter effect may 
dominate.  In such cases, allowing market relevance to be endogenous would serve to 
drive large- and small-country IPRs further apart, with large countries tightening their 
IPRs in a bid to attract virtual talent, and small countries weakening their intellectual 




  Existing models of two key policy issues affecting developing countries –
intellectual property protection and brain drain—have so far treated these issues largely 
in isolation from each other.  We study the interactions between these issues by 
introducing (costly) international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash 
equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries.  Our analysis identifies a number of 
considerations affecting optimal IPR policy that have not, to our knowledge, been noted 
before.  One of these is a “bidding for brains” effect, which—in contrast to existing IPR 
models—can generate excessive IPR protection in both sending and receiving countries, 
as both countries attempt to ‘outbid’ each other in providing a hospitable IPR   20
environment for internationally mobile knowledge workers.  We conjecture that the 
“bidding for brains” effect may become empirically relevant as some developing nations 
begin to contest the developed world’s attraction for their knowledge workers. 
 
In addition, we also identify an ‘expatriate brains’ effect, which – like the well 
known ‘free-riding’ effect—can give both brain-receiving and- sending countries 
incentives to underprotect IPRs relative to the global optimum.  Receiving countries will 
underprotect to the extent that they not do fully value the welfare of immigrant brains 
living in their country; sending countries can underprotect because the innovations 
produced by their own emigrants are less appropriate to the needs of sending-country 
consumers than innovations produced locally.  Indeed we point out that one reason why 
developing countries might prefer little or no IPR protection may be because their 
knowledge workers have already departed to serve larger, richer markets, where those 
workers produce ideas and goods that may no longer be valued by developing country 
consumers.     
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Appendix 1:  Proofs 
 
dz ~ /dω and dz ~ /dω*: 
The full expressions for dz ~ /dω and dz ~ /dω* are as follows: 
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Proof of Proposition 1.  
Part (a). Differentiating E(W
G) with respect to ω gives 






G *) ( ) ( ) (





 at Source’s non-cooperative best response, ω
NC(ω*). Assume for now the 
constraints ω≥0 and ω≤1 are non-binding on Source’s cooperative policy choice.  Then 
*) (
) (
    NC d
W dE

 = 0.  Differentiating E(W*) with respect to ω and evaluating at ω
NC(ω*) gives  
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Substituting in for dρ/dω,  dρ*/dω and d ) ~ (z F/ d ω and taking the limit as τ→1 yields 
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in which the right-hand term is unambiguously positive. Thus, for ω* for which Source’s 




For ω* such that the non-negativity binds Source’s non-cooperative policy 
choice, then the claim ω
G(ω*)≥ω
N(ω*) holds trivially as a result of the non-negativity 
constraint on ω
G.  Finally, for ω* such that the constraint ω
NC≤1 binds, then 
*) (
) (




 is greater than 
*) (
*) (
    NC d
W dE

, the latter of which is positive in the 
limit as τ→1 by (A2); consequently, for any ω* such that ω
NC(ω*)=1, ω
G(ω*) similarly 
equals unity by constraint. 
In sum, for τ sufficiently large, Source’s non-cooperative best response function 
lies everywhere either to the left of, or coincides with, ω
G(ω*).  





NC(ω) for ω such that ω*
G(ω)>0 and ω*
NC(ω)<1; i.e. Recipient’s non-  26
cooperative best response function lies everywhere either below, or in coincidence with, 
ω*
G(ω).   
 
Part (b): As per the proof of part (a), the non-cooperative best response functions lies 
weakly inside/below the global welfare maximizing best responses. Thus, when N=N* 
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NC <1) when τ is sufficiently large.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Taking the limit of (A1) as τ→0 gives 
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 < 0. Following steps 
similar to those for the proof of Proposition 1 part (a) confirms ω




NC(ω*)>0 when τ is sufficiently small.■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:   Differentiate W
G with respect to ω*, evaluate at ω*
NC(ω), and 
take the limit as τ→0 to get 
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provided the constraint ω*
NC  is non-binding.  When countries are symmetric, 
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is less than or equal to 
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2 2       z Df N     at any symmetric equilibrium whenever the ω*
NC≤1 
constraint is non-binding. If instead ωe*
NC= ωe
NC=1 then either 


























NC=1. Finally, if 







Proof of Proposition 4: As N→0, the final term in (A3) goes to zero and  ) ~ (z F → 
F(D(N*ω*π)
1+Ψ/[1+Ψ]) >0, indicating Recipient’s non-cooperative policy is too weak 
from a global welfare perspective provided D>0.   27
Appendix 2:  Illustration of the Expatriate Brains Effect 
 
  Here we examine numerically the equilibrium implications of the expatriate 
brains effect. As noted, this effect is more likely when Source’s market size is small, 
when τ is low, but when Source is relatively well endowed with innovative talent.  To 
illustrate this effect—it does not apply to the China vs US parameterization of our 
model—we assume τ =.1, and let D =.009; all other functional forms and parameter 
values are the same as in Section 6.  Reaction functions, shown in Figure A1, indicate a 
Nash equilibrium in which the Source “free rides” at zero protection.   
 
 








































In contrast, when we set a to zero (but maintain all other parameter values used to 
generate Figure A1 simulation), we find Source now chooses to protect IPRs in the Nash 
equilibrium; see Figure A2.  In this sense, for the right parameter values, brain drain to 
the North can “cause” low Southern IPRs.
34   
 
                                                 
34 Of course, there is no single developing country with a market (N) as large as China’s, but much better 
endowed with innovative talent.  Another example that produces the same outcome, however, would have 
N=.1 (about the size of Russia), with τ=.03 and Russia as well endowed with innovative talent as the U.S. 
(D=.003).     28
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